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Mighty nation states and fragile international body: The German-Polish minority policy 
of the League of Nations as an early experiment in global governance 
Abstract 
Globalization scholars generally acknowledge the United Nations as a key 
transnational actor that helps to regulate the globalized world by means of an 
institutionalized network of norms and agreements. However, it is often 
forgotten that the United Nations’ successful development is fundamentally 
rooted in its historical predecessor: the League of Nations. Through a 
historical-sociological analysis of an extreme case study, namely the German-
Polish minority policy of the League of Nations, we emphasize this early root 
of global governance and explore the early manifestations of a key issue in the 
contemporary globalization debate: the tension between global institutions and 
nation states. Our analysis reveals four key features that help to conceptualize 
this tension field: the broad actorhood of the nation state(1), with nationalism 
as a consequence thereof(2), and the League of Nation’s lack of repressive 
capacity(3) as an important incentive for decoupling(4). This historical-
sociological case study shows that the world culture grants significant power to 
the nation states, which makes them crucial actors in the globalized world. 
Hence our framework contributes to the widely discussed debate about the 
global-national tension field and could also provide a steppingstone for 
examining current relations between nation states and the United Nations. 
Keywords 
global governance; nation states; tension field; World War I; League of 
Nations; German-Polish minority policy 
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Introduction 
Globalization scholars generally acknowledge the United Nations as a key 
transnational actor that helps to regulate the globalized world by means of an institutionalized 
network of norms and agreements. However, it is often forgotten that the United Nation’s 
successful development is fundamentally rooted in its historical predecessor: the League of 
Nations. According to Pedersen (2007), the League of Nations was a first clear attempt at 
global governance. This supranational organization, established after World War I with the 
goal of international cooperation, peace and security (Walters 1960, Northwestern University 
Library 2010) was indeed one of the first gatherings of nation states around the world and 
thus forms a significant yet overlooked subject in globalization studies.  
This article aims to emphasize this early root of global governance by exploring how 
globalization theorizing can shed light on a key issue in the contemporary globalization 
debate: the tension between the diffusion of a generalized global model and the remaining 
power of the nation states (see for example: Sassen 1998, 2006, 2007, Castells 2000, Held 
2000, 2006, Faist 2001, Turner 2001, Linklater 2002, Benhabib 2005, 2009, Beck 2007, 2008, 
Kivisto and Faist 2007, Nash 2009a, 2009b).Much has been written regarding this subject, 
with some authors swearing by the optimistic outlook of a harmonious globalized world and 
others being critical by pointing to the possible hindrances and obstacles being set up by the 
nation states. However, there is a more qualified position in this debate that is increasingly 
being expressed, where the importance of the nation state is part of the globalization story and 
creates a tension field of which the outcome is not always straightforward. This article takes a 
position closer to this last perspective and reveals that the League of Nations indeed marked 
the diffusion of a world culture, but wherein the broad power of the nation state counted as an 
important principle. 
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In this article, we explore the early roots of this tension field through an extreme case 
study, namely the German-Polish minority policy, because we believe this case is a marked 
example of the strained relationships between the nation states and the League. Our research 
centered around the question: How can the concepts of actorhood (Meyer et al. 2009, Meyer 
and Jepperson 2009), nationalism, lack of repressive capacity, and decoupling (Meyer and 
Rowan 1977, Meyer et al. 2009) help to clarify the tension field that characterized the 
German-Polish minority policy as an early global governance experiment of the League of 
Nations? To answer this question, we pursue a secondary analysis of renowned sources 
regarding to the League of Nations and its minority policy (De Azcarate 1945, Walters 1960, 
Horak 1961, Fink 1972, 1979, 1981, 1995, 1996, 2000, Mazower 1997, 2004, Raitz von 
Frentz 1999). In this article, we begin with a short historical introduction into the League of 
Nations and its minority policy and then provide clear links between the four key concepts 
(actorhood, nationalism, lack of repressive capacity, and decoupling) and the historical case 
study.  
German-Polish minority policy of the League of Nations  
The political map of Central and Eastern Europe was redesigned during the peace 
conference in Paris after World War I (Raitz von Frentz 1999). Although one tried to take into 
account the ethnic distribution of the population, the decisions were also steered by promises 
made during the war by the allied powers and by achieved military facts. In this way, 
although the total amount of ethnic minorities in Europe lessened from 50 to 20 million, new 
minorities were created (Thornberry 1980), and thus the development of a minority policy 
was inevitable.  
Poland was one of the new minority states. The country was founded as a monarchy 
on 5 November 1916 (Horak 1961). The new Polish territory included Russian terrain that had 
been captured by German and Austrian troops. Hereby a great number of Germans now fell 
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under Polish jurisdiction. Poland signed the minority treaty with allied and associated powers 
on 28 June 1919 as a prerequisite for the recognition of Poland as a nation state, but without 
great enthusiasm (Mazower 1997). After years of weakness and dominance by Russia, Poland 
was determined to become a strong nation state, and it would not allow the minorities to 
interfere with this goal (Horak 1961).  
Poland is considered to be one of the most important experiments in Europe in terms 
of national minorities (De Azcarate 1945). The League of Nations dedicated most of its time 
to petitions from German minorities in Poland, in comparison to other minority states (De 
Azcarate 1945, Raitz von Frentz 1999). Furthermore, Polish integral nationalism and German 
revisionism are seen as the biggest challenges to the system of minority protection (Raitz von 
Frentz 1999). The continuing public confrontation between the two countries even led to the 
collapse of the minority policy in 1934, when Poland suspended its cooperation with the 
system. Poland and Germany can thus be defined as protagonists in the story of minority 
protection. 
The minority treaty guaranteed political, juridical, cultural, social, religious and 
economic equality for all non-Polish citizens (Horak 1961). Moreover, the minority state 
needed to accept these provisions as basic laws, whereby all conflicting laws, regulations or 
actions were invalidated (Thornberry 1980). Important and innovative was article 12 in this 
treaty, the so called ‘guarantee clause’ (Horak 1961). This clause made the League of Nations 
a guarantor for the minorities, which meant that for the first time the sovereignty and power of 
the nation states was restricted and partly transferred to a supranational body. However, later 
in this article we will show that nation states still had a lot of power in the debates about 
minority issues.  
More specifically, the responsibility for enforcing minority rights lay with the 
Council1. 
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Any Member of the Council shall have the right to bring to the attention of the 
Council any infraction or any danger of infraction of any of these obligations, and the 
Council may thereupon take such action and give such direction as it may deem proper 
and effective in the circumstances (De Azcarate 1945, p. 94, Fink 1972, p. 331). 
However, this encompassed a grave political responsibility, and therefore minorities 
were also permitted to petition the Secretary-General, because then the Council members 
would have a legitimate reason to treat a complaint (Fink 1995). However, in this way, the 
Council members were still heavily burdened, given the large amount of petitions. That is 
why for each new petition a Committee of Three was appointed. This committee had to 
decide on the basis of eligibility criteria if the petition merited the attention of the Council. If 
this was the case, a thorough but covert investigation in cooperation with the Minorities 
Section of the Secretariat2 of the League of Nations was installed, whereby the accused state 
was asked to justify itself (Thornberry 1980).  
When the negotiations between the Committee of Three and the accused state were not 
satisfying, the case was put on the agenda of the Council with formal recommendation 
(Thornberry 1980). Only when a member state decided to take up the case, was it treated by 
the Council and the minority informed of the proceedings of the complaint. But this occurred 
very rarely (Fink 1995). When it did happen, a public discussion and voting round was held, 
followed by a resolution that recommended specific action. However, this voting was 
organized after a unanimity rule, whereby the accused state could install serious delays by not 
agreeing with the resolution. When the accused state and the Council could not settle the 
dispute, the case was brought before the Permanent Court of International Justice, whose 
decision was considered final (Walters 1960). 
The procedure as described above was partly realized during the conflict concerning 
the Polish elections in 1930 (Fink 1981). On 16 and 23 November, elections were held for the 
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so-called national ‘Sjem’, the Senate and the ‘Sjem’ of Upper-Silesia (Raitz von Frentz 1999). 
But these elections were disrupted by a campaign of terror and intimidation on a large scale, 
with disastrous consequences for the German minority and its representation in the 
parliament.  
In reaction to this, a drastic step was taken by Julius Curtius, the German Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, who directly filed a complaint with the Council (Fink 1995, Raitz von Frentz 
1999). This had never been done before, as a complaint of a Council member was normally 
preceded by a petition (Ratliff 1989, Fink 1995, Raitz von Frentz 1999). The complaint 
accused Poland of arbitrary measures by the government that withheld the German citizens 
from voting (in private), and of the terror campaign held by a non-governmental paramilitary 
organization (‘Union of Silesian Insurgents’) in collusion with the authorities (Raitz von 
Frentz, 1999). The Polish state was thus accused of being co-responsible for the unjust 
treatment of the minorities. 
In the observations from Poland, the argument that minority states needed protection 
from the intervention of other nation states in their internal affairs was dominant (Raitz von 
Frentz 1999). According to Poland, the right to hold elections and choose election procedures 
was indeed an integral part of the national sovereignty, and thus only Polish judges were 
competent to settle disputes about this. 
The case was discussed in the Assembly of the Council in January 1931, in which 
Germany was allowed to participate (Fink 1981). Calonder (president of the Mixed 
Commission in Upper Silesia) investigated the case and concluded that the guilty needed to be 
punished and the victims needed to be compensated for their pain. This was refuted by the 
Polish government, and by Pablo de Azcárate, the director of the Minorities Section at that 
time, who advocated for a neutral investigation into the problems that occurred during the 
elections (Ratliff 1989). Poland delivered such an impartial assessment (made by a Polish 
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official!) wherein the conclusion was made that no abnormalities occurred during the 
elections. The Japanese representative, Yoshizawa, advised the Council in his capacity as 
rapporteur to ask a detailed report from the Polish government containing the results of the 
performed investigations as well as the implemented punishments and compensations (Raitz 
von Frentz 1999). 
Poland submitted the requested report and proclaimed that it had met the needs of the 
League of Nations (Fink 1981). Germany did not agree and postponed the approval of the 
conclusions in the case. Eventually the case was concluded in the September report, which 
acknowledged that the Polish efforts were not sufficient and advocated for better treatment in 
the future. Although this was a judgment in favor of Germany, it had little positive impact on 
the lives of the German minority members, as the League of Nations accepted the empty 
promise of Poland that it would make all possible efforts to restore the trust of the German 
minority, without monitoring this in practice (Raitz von Frentz 1999).  
From the discussion of the usual procedure for minority complaints and of the conflict 
concerning the Polish elections, it is clear that the early globalization was not equivalent to a 
harmonious diffusion of international norms. The tension between the nation state and the 
international body was omnipresent from the beginning of the creation of this body. This 
article tries to grasp this tension field by examining the historical case using some 
conceptualizing key concepts: actorhood of the nation state, nationalism as a consequence 
thereof, lack of repressive capacity and decoupling. 
Conceptualizing the tension field between nation states and the League of Nations 
externalized in the German-Polish minority policy 
The analysis of the historical case study is inspired by Meyer’s theory about world 
culture, developed from within neo-institutionalism. According to this scientific current, the 
environment determines certain institutional rules or myths, to which organizations then adapt 
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their structure and operation (isomorphism) (Meyer and Rowan 1977, Dimaggio and Powell 
1983, McKinley and Mone 2003). This isomorphism does not occur because of efficiency 
motives but because of a longing for legitimacy.  
Meyer elaborated on these so called institutional myths and concluded that these 
myths in a globalizing world constitute a world culture or polity (Drori and Krücken 2009). 
Furthermore, it can be said that nation states are the most important institutes today (Meyer et 
al. 2009). Meyer (2009) points to the dominance of an instrumental, rational culture with 
explicit roots in Western society. In particular, he observes the diffusion of a global model 
wherein national identity and the linked goals like socio-economic development, prosperity, 
individual justice, rights and equality are dominant. In brief, Meyer claims that nation states 
adapt to global norms of justice and progression by producing regulated scripts of social 
policy, hoping that in that way they will be accepted as legitimate members of world society 
(Drori and Krücken 2009). So, on the one hand, Meyer notices the diffusion of a world 
culture, but on the other he indicates that this world culture grants the nation states the highest 
power. 
Actorhood of the nation state 
Meyer elucidates the importance of the nation state using the concept actorhood, and 
therefore this concept can also help us to clarify the power of the nation states at the time of 
the League of Nations. In the global world, nation states are the actors with the greatest 
actorhood (Meyer et al. 2009). The nation state is a strongly legitimized and fundamental 
action unit, a rational and responsible actor that can determine its territorial borders and its 
circumscribed population. It is the best possible sovereign, responsible actor. With this theory, 
Meyer thus refutes the idea that globalization is abating the sovereignty of the nation state. 
This is a widely discussed theme in the globalization debate (see for example: Sassen 1998, 
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2006, 2007, Castells 2000, Held 2000, 2006, Faist 2001, Turner 2001, Linklater 2002, 
Benhabib 2005, 2009, Beck 2007, 2008, Kivisto and Faist 2007, Nash 2009a, 2009b). 
This article is based upon Meyer’s thesis that globalization is not limiting but actually 
consolidates the actorhood of the nation state, because it is the only legitimate institution to 
handle today’s world problems (Sassen 1998, O'Byrne 2003, Benhabib 2005, 2009, Meyer et 
al. 2009, Nash 2009b). This article will also exemplify that the foundation of the League of 
Nations, which can be considered as an early root of globalization, was not necessarily 
characterized by a limited actorhood of the nation states. Instead, in this article, we will 
demonstrate that nation states were actually the most powerful actors at that time.  
Nation states are mighty actors but do not all possess the same degree of actorhood. 
This is not directly mentioned by Meyer, but Larrain (1994) for example indicates that 
Western countries are viewed as superior to non-Western countries. In this vision, the cultural 
identity of the West is characterized by instrumental reason, as opposed to the chaotic and 
irrational way of living in the other, non-Western countries. The other countries are not 
familiar with this reason, which is what gives the West the right to civilize these countries 
upon their way to progress. This notion is important to remember for the analysis of the 
League of Nations, as this was a gathering of Western as well as non-Western countries. In 
what follows, we will demonstrate that there was indeed an unequal distribution of power 
between the nation states. 
According to Meyer et al. (2009), the world culture counts multiple levels of 
legitimized actorhood. But the different actors do not always share the same interests, and this 
causes potential conflict. This is an important idea in the context of this article, as the 
minority policy of the League of Nations was actually an attempt to unify the interests of 
three different actors (the nation states, the minorities and the League of Nations itself). As 
mentioned above, the current world culture provides the nation states with the highest degree 
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of actorhood. As a consequence, the interests and wishes of the nation states prevailed in 
minority issues, which lead to protest and discontent from the minorities, and to a declined 
credibility of the League of Nations.  
The motivation behind the minority policy begins to reveal the real power relations in 
the League of Nations. Multiple authors indicate that the minority policy was adopted to 
prevent war in the future, rather than because of a genuine concern for the minorities (De 
Azcarate 1945, Thornberry 1980, Fink 1996, Mazower 1997, Preece 1997, Raitz von Frentz 
1999). The League provided for minority rights because it feared ethnic civil wars or 
interventions of a so called kin state in the name of the protection of its ethnic minority (De 
Azcarate 1945, Fink 1996, Preece 1997, Raitz von Frentz 1999). The central motivation 
behind the minority policy, therefore, was not protecting the minorities but protecting the 
current world order, which means that it were not the interests of the minorities but those of 
the nation states that prevailed. This demonstrates the broad actorhood provided for the nation 
states by the League of Nations. 
We can also take a critical look at the underlying goal of the minority policy. Multiple 
authors agree that this goal was actually assimilation (Fink 1972, 1996, Mazower 1997, 
Preece 1997). Although providing for minority rights is directly associated with more freedom 
and autonomy for the minorities, it was exactly this freedom that one wanted to limit through 
the minority protection system: 
By internationally bestowing civil and political equality and a minimal amount of 
cultural protection upon persons belonging to national minorities, it was believed that 
they would be less likely to pursue their own separate nationalist aspirations and 
instead would become contented and loyal citizens of the newly created political units 
(Preece 1997, p. 346). 
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By keeping the minorities content with a few basic rights, it was thus hoped that they 
would not attack the new division of the world. The goal was thus national unity, and the 
minority policy was only seen as a means to this goal (Fink 1972). 
Moreover, the denomination of the minorities in the treaties is a striking demonstration 
of the underlying assimilation goal of the minority policy. Because the authors of the Polish 
minority treaty tried to avoid the national minorities being seen as self-regulatory ‘corporate 
entities’, they did not name the Polish minority as ‘national minorities’, but as ‘Polish 
nationals who belong to racial, religious or linguistic minorities’ (Fink 1995, 1996, 2000, 
Raitz von Frentz 1999). At all costs, the authors wanted to fence off the possible creation of a 
state within a state (Fink 1995, 1996). One can thus imagine the power of the model of the 
homogeneous nation state. 
Third, it is important to mention that the minority policy had no universal character. 
This was thoroughly criticized by the minority states from the beginning (De Azcarate 1945, 
Fink 1972, Thornberry 1980, Mazower 1997, Preece 1997, Raitz von Frentz 1999). They 
believed that it was not fair that only they were limited by minority treaties while other nation 
states had minorities as well but were not subjected to control. However, that the League of 
Nations would obtain the right to interfere with the internal constitution of every country and 
thus become a kind of super state was unthinkable (Mazower 1997). The non-universal 
character was legitimized by the thesis that the newly created states were subordinated and 
thus needed special supervision (Fink 1996, Mazower 1997, Cowan 2003). This inequality 
between nation states reflects Larrain’s (1994) idea about the superiority of the Western 
nation states. 
As stated above, minorities could submit petitions to the League of Nations in case of 
problems, which were then evaluated on admissibility by the Committee of Three and could 
be taken up by a Council member to discuss in public (De Azcarate 1945, Fink 1972, 1995). 
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This procedure proves again the wide scope of the actorhood of the nation state: only they 
had the authority to bring a minority issue to the attention of the Council. The petitioner, thus, 
had no direct influence on this and could only hope for the support of a member state. Hereby, 
minorities were obliged to address their kin state for representing their problem (Raitz von 
Frentz 1999). Minorities who did not have such a link (the so called orphan minorities), were 
just unlucky. 
Likewise, the non-juridical character of the appellation procedure indicates that nation 
states had the most actorhood (De Azcarate 1945, Raitz von Frentz 1999, Cowan 2003). 
They defined the procedure as “political” rather than “judicial”, and argued that the 
petition should be treated “purely as information" rather than as an accusation 
requiring a reply. They held, therefore, that petitioners were not party to a dialogue, a 
negotiation or arbitration (Cowan 2003, p. 273). 
The League feared that the minority procedure would get acknowledged as a juridical 
procedure because the risk was created that nation states would be judged, what would not 
accord with the nation state’s right to internal consolidation (De Azcarate 1945). This 
demonstrates the dominance of state sovereignty, which had enormous consequences for the 
minorities, because these were not informed of the proceedings or of the fact that their 
petition was rejected. 
The direct indictment of Curtius following the injustice during the elections of 1930 
and the reactions to this accusation demonstrate the broad actorhood of the nation state. The 
direct charge came unexpected, as a charge from a Council member was normally always 
preceded by a petition (Ratliff 1989, Fink 1995, Raitz von Frentz 1999). The fact that Curtius 
succeeded in putting the election issue on the agenda of the Council, proves that this nation 
state had a great deal of power and could even push the boundaries of its already broad 
actorhood. On the other hand, this action elicited strong protest from Poland. Poland argued 
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that Germany was interfering with the internal constitution of the country, which could not be 
accepted given the sovereignty principle (Fink 1981, Raitz von Frentz 1999). Particularly as 
regards to elections, it was indispensable that a sovereign state could organize this 
independently. The strong protest following Germany’s infringement of the principle shows 
the enormous strength of this principle and thus of the actorhood of the nation state. 
It is apparent, then, that although the League of Nations established the minority 
policy and thereby made the minority a legitimate actor, this minority was still stuck at a 
substantial lower power level than the nation state and was often curtailed in its wishes and 
needs. This because of the multiple levels of legitimized actorhood and the fact that the nation 
states dominated this hierarchy. 
Nationalism/revisionism caused by the idea of the nation state 
The broad actorhood of the nation states has implications not only for the minorities 
and the League of Nations, but also for the nation states. Nation states are rational, 
autonomous and responsible actors that can determine the territorial borders and a 
circumscribed population (Meyer et al. 2009). Lechner and Boli (2005) claim that nation 
states have the legitimacy and authority to present, implement, and even universalize a certain 
vision. Because the world culture grants this right to every actor and thus to every nation 
state, everyone has the right to present its vision as the best and universal one (Meyer et al. 
2009). 
In other words, states have the power to implement and universalize their vision about 
the nation (the ethnic groups) their state needs to embody. Therefore, it can be argued that 
nationalism is a logical consequence of the broad power granted to nation states and that it is 
thus wrong to simply blame the German and/or Polish nationalism for the failure of the 
minority protection. Meyer’s theory indeed points to the important distinction that it is the 
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world culture itself, and the idea of the nation state therein, that is responsible for producing 
nationalism (Lechner and Boli 2005, Meyer et al. 2009). 
Germany and Poland were indeed characterized by a strong nationalistic and/or 
revisionist identity. Multiple authors agree that Germany became member of the Council and 
defended the minorities as their great protector in order to prepare the international 
community for a redrawing of the boundaries (De Azcarate 1945, Enssle 1977, Ratliff 1989, 
Preece 1997, Raitz von Frentz 1999). Rather than genuine care for the minorities, it was their 
demographic asset that motivated the Germans (Raitz von Frentz 1999). This because 
territorial revision could only take place through a plebiscite in the favor of Germany. 
This nationalistic motivation is also well illustrated in the example of the Polish 
elections of 1930. Curtius did not want to protect the German minorities out of idealism, but 
because of imperialistic goals (Ratliff 1989). He saw the revision of the German-Polish border 
as the only solution for the Polish political violence. Moreover, the fact that he took the 
drastic decision to directly submit a charge with the Council was strongly steered by 
nationalistic pressure in his country (Walters 1960, Fink 1972, 1981, Ratliff 1989, Raitz von 
Frentz 1999). 
It is thus important to scrutinize Germany as the great minority protector. Yet this does 
not mean that the charges against Poland were exaggerated (Blanke 1990). The German 
minority was indeed maltreated by Poland, and again nationalism was an important motivator 
(Horak 1961, Raitz von Frentz 1999). After being a weak, incoherent country for so many 
years, Poland was now determined to prove its strength, especially to Germany (Horak 1961). 
This had disastrous consequences for the German minority in Poland. ‘On this basis, it 
appears that almost anything that local or regional officials could devise to diminish the 
German population found approval higher up and could also count on the support of what 
passed for public opinion’ (Blanke 1990, p. 89). 
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Although the Polish nationalism was thus strongly present from the beginning of the 
Polish regime, the years 1921-1926 can still be considered as a democratic period (Horak 
1961). After the coup d’état by Marshal Jozef Pilsudski in 1926, the rights and freedom of the 
minorities rapidly decreased. The extreme nationalists, including the so called Union of 
Insurgents, wanted to install a new constitution, and as a means to do so, they mistreated the 
minorities during the elections, hoping they would be intimidated (Horak 1961, Raitz von 
Frentz 1999). Moreover, the Union of Insurgents got financial support from the government 
and its direction counted a lot of government officials (Raitz von Frentz 1999). The 
government was thus consciously involved in the nationalistic anti-minority policy, and this 
led to a bloody culmination during the elections in 1930. 
So nationalism was the cause of both the terrorism during the elections in 1930 and the 
heavy German reaction to this, and helps us to understand why both Germany and Poland 
were so obstinate in the negotiations about the charge. Nationalism was thus a vigorous 
malefactor for international cooperation, but it may not be forgotten that this obstacle was 
created by the very cultural background of this international cooperation. 
Lack of repressive capacity and forced negotiations 
Besides the broad power of the nation states, the historical literature repeatedly points 
to the lack of enforceable procedures and the consequential negotiation attitude of the League 
of Nations towards the nation states. Meyer also talks about this lack of enforceability in his 
theory of world culture. Meyer (2009) speaks of the modern world as a broad ‘world polity’ 
instead of as a strong world bureaucracy. The way actorhood is structured in the 
contemporary cultural model causes dynamism because nobody has central control or 
repressive capacity (Meyer et al. 2009). 
The lack of repressive capacity of the League of Nations towards the nation states is 
indeed strongly emphasized in various books and articles (De Azcarate 1945, Walters 1960, 
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Horak 1961, Fink 1979, 1981, 1995, 2000, Thornberry 1980, Ratliff 1989, Raitz von Frentz 
1999, Mazower 2004). Although the guarantee clause in the minority treaty suggests that the 
League of Nations could take broad actions when a minority state broke the treaty, in practice 
it had narrow possibilities, whereof negotiation with the accused state was the most promising 
(De Azcarate 1945). ‘The League was not, of course, a supreme state organisation, but merely 
an international body. Ultimately, what could not be achieved by persuasion and mediation 
could not be achieved at all’ (Thornberry 1980, 436). 
The only weapon at the disposal of the Minorities Committee was to bring the case to 
the Council or the Permanent Court of International Justice, as every government feared to be 
publicly accused (Walters 1960, Raitz von Frentz 1999). But De Azcarate (1945), former 
director of the Minorities Section, indicates that the petitions from minorities were rarely 
judged as sufficiently severe to be brought before the Council. The accused government 
always got the opportunity to solve the issue, whereby the Minorities Committees almost 
always started to negotiate with the nation states about the most appropriate solution (De 
Azcarate 1945, Thornberry 1980, Fink 1995, 1996, Raitz von Frentz 1999). They thus 
preferred negotiation over unilateral public sanctions, because they knew there were no 
sufficient enforcement measures (De Azcarate 1945). 
Furthermore, the Committee of Three, when it for once did judge the petition merited 
the attention of the Council, had a false authority, because it was not considered as a juridical 
institution (Raitz von Frentz 1999). The members of the Council remained free to decide if 
they would bring the petition to the attention. The committee was thus no strong and credible 
body, while it was one of the most important agencies in the minority policy. Moreover, if the 
case was in a rare instance discussed by the Council, even the decisions of this latter body 
were not legally binding and mere guidelines. So every member remained free to decide if it 
would implement the recommendations of the League of Nations. 
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Likewise, the lack of decisiveness came to the fore during the handling of the 
complaint about the terror during the Polish elections. When Calonder wrote a report wherein 
he judged the injustice and demanded reprimands for the guilty, the Polish government was 
able to simply deny and dismiss these findings (Fink 1981, Ratliff 1989). The League of 
Nations was not powerful enough to install a neutral investigation, whose results would be 
acknowledged. Furthermore, although the report requested by Yoshizawa about the carried 
out penalties and compensations was internationally acknowledged as insufficient, the League 
eventually had to settle for Poland’s promise that it would do all possible efforts to restore the 
confidence of the German minority, without following this up on site (Fink 1981, Ratliff 
1989, Raitz von Frentz 1999). This because of a lack of means and the belief that the minority 
was no active party in the dispute (Raitz von Frentz 1999). The League could only hope for 
the goodwill and active cooperation of Poland, because without this the measures (like 
Calonder’s report and the report requested by Yoshizawa) fizzled out.  
What again strikingly illustrates the lack of repressive capacity is the fact that in 1934 
Poland could simply declare it would no longer cooperate with the minority treaty (Horak 
1961). Poland found it unfair that it had to handle its affairs under the supervision of the 
League and did not have the immunity granted to other countries (Walters 1960). This action 
from Poland left the League and the minorities powerless behind (Horak 1961).  
What connects to this powerlessness, is the fact that the most repressive measure the 
League of Nations could take was the exclusion of a country out of the League (Walters 
1960). Article 16 of the covenant reads: 
Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League may be 
declared to be no longer a Member of the League by a vote of the Council concurred 
in by the Representatives of all the other Members of the League represented thereon 
(Walters 1960, p. 52). 
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However, the ineffectiveness of this measure is very clear, as a state actually had the 
freedom to treat its minorities as it wished in case of exclusion (Walters 1960). Furthermore, 
the exclusion could be taken up as an excuse to drop all legal commitments towards its 
minorities (Raitz von Frentz 1999). 
It can thus be concluded that the League of Nations had no enforcement power, 
enabling the nation states to continue to follow their own national logic, although they 
subscribed to international minority treaties. This latter discrepancy is described by Meyer as 
decoupling. 
Decoupling 
Decoupling refers to the fact that institutions do adapt their formal structure to the 
institutionalized myths (isomorphism) but disconnect their informal operation from this 
(Meyer and Rowan 1977). In doing so, they can benefit from the advantages of isomorphism, 
namely winning legitimacy, without jeopardizing their efficient functioning. 
Applied to the nation states in the League of Nations, this implies that nation states 
formally agreed with the covenant, the minority treaties and the derived resolutions, but in 
practice they often reverted to the own national logic, so that a lot of idealized goals of the 
League were not realized. Concerning the Polish minority treaty, Poland indeed decoupled its 
formal obligations in the treaty from the actual policy towards its minorities (Horak 1961). ‘It 
follows that the Poles, ruling over millions of non-Poles in the period 1920-39, were not 
willing to enforce their laws, making the statutes empty promises’ (Horak 1961, p. 77-78). 
Meyer searches for the reasons behind this decoupling and concludes that the latter is a 
logical consequence, as the world culture encompasses different actors and visions, which 
sometimes conflict (Meyer et al. 2009). Furthermore, the world culture is strongly idealized 
and not always realistic. Also, it is not always in accordance with the most efficient programs. 
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Applied to the minority policy of the League of Nations, it can be said that nation states 
engaged in decoupling because the international principles conflicted with the principles and 
logic of the nation state. Indeed, the minority treaties limited the power of the nation states, so 
it is not surprising the nation states did not want to let this happen. That this also applied to 
Poland, is reflected in the following quote: ‘International obligations, assumed under pressure 
by the Polish government, were not carried out, because these obligations were in 
fundamental opposition to the program of various Polish political parties. These parties placed 
the interest of their State above international duties’ (Horak 1961, p. 182). 
On the level of the League of Nations, decoupling was also strongly present. In 
particular, this was expressed in the fact that the petitions of the minorities were almost never 
discussed by the Council (Rosting 1923, De Azcarate 1945, Thornberry 1980, Blanke 1990, 
Fink 1995, 1996, Mazower 1997, Raitz von Frentz 1999, Cowan 2003). Between 1921 and 
1939 950 petitions were received, but only 550 petitions were declared as admissible and only 
11 of these were presented to the Council by the Committee of Three (Raitz von Frentz 1999). 
The reasons for this were, among others, the slow and complicated procedures, the restraint of 
the League to judge a nation state, and the strict admissibility criteria (Rosting 1923, Horak 
1961, Fink 1972, Blanke 1990, Raitz von Frentz 1999, Cowan 2003). 
Furthermore, when a petition did get the attention of the Council, the action the latter 
could undertake was very broadly defined, whereby the possibility for decoupling was 
created: ‘…and the Council may thereupon take such action and give such direction as it may 
deem proper and effective in the circumstance’ (De Azcarate 1945, p. 94, Fink 1972, p. 331). 
It is clear that this definition is so broad and vague that it was able to justify every action, 
even if it was not meaningful and low-powered. Hereby the League could backtrack from its 
idealized policy and impose less grave sanctions in practice. 
Conclusion and discussion 
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During World War I, the idea was shared in various countries that this war needed to 
be the last (Walters 1960). The eventual result of this was the foundation of the League of 
Nations, an international body that would allow the different countries to cooperate, striving 
for peace and security (Northwestern University Library 2010). Although most globalization 
theories emphasize the period after World War II, the indignation about the cruelty of the first 
World War thus also launched an international experiment. 
However, this early international experiment suffered from a range of problems, which 
were usually framed within a tension field between an international body in infancy and the 
powerful nation states. This tension field has been widely discussed in the globalization 
debate. With regard to the German-Polish minority policy, the situation was even more 
complicated, because now not only the League of Nations and the nation states, but also the 
German minorities could claim their rights.  
The main aim of the article was to clarify this complex tension field by using the 
following set of key concepts: actorhood (Meyer et al. 2009, Meyer and Jepperson 2009), 
nationalism, lack of repressive capacity, and decoupling (Meyer and Rowan 1977, Meyer et 
al. 2009). First, Meyer’s concept actorhood was useful in illuminating the dominance of the 
nation state after World War I. In the world culture, the nation state is the best possible 
sovereign, responsible actor (Meyer et al. 2009). However, because of the minority policy, the 
interests of three different actors – the nation states, the minorities and the League itself – 
needed to be combined. That this combination did not work out because of the dominance of 
the interests of the nation states can be linked to the broad actorhood granted to the nation 
states. 
It can be claimed that nationalism is a logical consequence of this broad actorhood. 
The power of nation states reached so far that they were capable of implementing and even 
universalizing their national vision. From the analysis, it was clear that German and Polish 
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nationalism were indeed important obstacles. An important distinction, however, is that it is 
the world culture itself, and the idea of the nation state therein, that produces nationalism 
(Lechner and Boli 2005, Meyer et al. 2009). This implies that as long as central actorhood is 
granted to the nation state, nationalism will always remain a potential danger, whether one 
invests in a minority policy or not.  
Another important obstacle was the League of Nation’s lack of enforceable measures, 
so that it was forced to engage in conciliatory negotiations. Meyer (2009) speaks of the 
modern world as a broad world polity instead of a strong world bureaucracy. Unfortunately, 
this means that the League was powerless against certain injustices with respect to the 
minorities. 
The minority states were aware of this powerlessness and so they continued to repress 
their minorities, although they formally agreed with the minority treaties. Although the 
League of Nations intended to deal with these injustices through a petition procedure, this 
turned out powerless in practice. We described this discrepancy between the formal minority 
policy and the actual unjust practice as decoupling, the phenomenon that institutions do adapt 
their formal structure to the institutionalized myths (isomorphism) but disconnect their 
informal operation from this (Meyer and Rowan 1977). 
The broad actorhood of the nation state with nationalism as a consequence and the 
lack of repressive capacity as an important incentive for decoupling together compose a 
sociological-theoretical framework that helped to conceptualize the global-national tension 
field present in the German-Polish minority policy of the League of Nations. It showed that 
this policy was indeed an international experiment whereby certain principles were diffused 
across the nation states. However, these principles encompassed a great actorhood granted to 
the nation states, which enabled nationalism and justified the lack of repressive capacity of the 
League, which, in turn, allowed for decoupling to take place. This illustrated the middle 
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position in the tension field debate, demonstrating that globalization is indeed taking place, 
but that the nation state is playing an important role in this process. 
In conclusion, the insights presented in this article could also offer an enlightening 
perspective on the current international cooperation in the United Nations. The minority 
protection is indeed transformed to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Thornberry 
1980, Preece 1997, Mazower 2004). Although it seems that they are two quite different 
policies, the same forces, ideas, questions, dilemmas and contradictions are present, 
something we can describe as path dependency. Therefore, further research might analyze the 
United Nations through the same sociological perspective that was used in this article. Doing 
so would likely show that the tension field that was brought into existence from the 
beginnings of global governance is still omnipresent, and that the concepts illustrated here 
would help to clarify this tension field in the United Nations today. 
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Notes 
1. Body within the League of Nations founded to settle international disputes (Northwestern 
University Library 2010). 
2. The tasks of this agency were preparing the agenda and publish reports (Northwestern 
University Library 2010). There were different sections to carry out these tasks on the 
different domains in an efficient manner (Walters 1960). 
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